Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing

Holding a group responsible for a wrong it has done sits uneasily with the individual-centred principle that underpins much of modern law and liberal political thought. Yet relatively little work has examined what follows when groups are actually held to account. Since a group cannot be imprisoned or fined in the way a person can, the question is whether groups can be punished at all, and if they can, how. Are there other forms of redress that might serve instead?

The volume brings together scholars from law, philosophy and political science to pursue these questions. Contributors look at where individual criminal liability falls short when atrocities occur, what punishment and responsibility actually mean, how a penalty imposed on a collective might reach its individual members, and the ways collective accountability can be expressed.

The essays also revisit the legacy of the Nuremberg Trials, consider how philosophers understand collective responsibility, and assess the place of collective accountability in relations between states.