Choosing War

Fredrik Logevall's study looks at how the United States came to fight a full-scale war in Vietnam between 1963 and 1965. He sets American choices against the wider international situation and the political pressures at home. His central argument is that the war was not inevitable. Officials of the period, including those who were most doubtful about the chances of success, opted for war rather than withdrawal. They did so even as prominent critics inside the country and abroad warned against it.

The book covers the decision-making of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations during the years when the conflict was escalating. Logevall examines the views of the key players, their private doubts about the prospects for victory, and the ways in which domestic politics and Cold War assumptions shaped their judgments. He uses this material to challenge the idea that the outcome could only be understood with hindsight.

The work is aimed at readers of American diplomatic history, the Vietnam War and Cold War foreign policy, as well as general readers interested in how governments reach decisions about going to war.