Dynamic Allocation and Pricing
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About this book
Gershkov and Moldovanu offer a way to find optimal prices and allocations over time by applying mechanism design theory to dynamic settings. Their approach combines the tractable dynamic models of operations research, management science and computer science with the older tools of classical mechanism design. Practical situations of this kind include selling seasonal merchandise at retail, distributing a fixed stock across a span of time, and matching staff to tasks as they arrive. Most of these problems fall within mechanism design, yet revenue management research has tended to examine only narrow families of pricing and allocation rules.
The authors build their treatment in stages. They first consider nonstrategic models in which all information is known and the solutions can be written out explicitly. Next they introduce strategic agents who hold private information and study how this changes the designer's optimization problem. Working through both the nonstrategic and strategic layers in sequence makes clear how dynamic trade-offs and incentives pull against each other.
The book covers the sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects, dynamic revenue optimization for heterogeneous goods, revenue maximization in the stochastic and dynamic knapsack model, the link between learning about demand and dynamic efficiency, and dynamic models with long-lived strategic agents.
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Book Details
- ISBN
- 9780262028400
- Author
- Alex Gershkov
- Publisher
- Unknown Publisher
- Genres
- Business & Economics
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