Facing Down the Soviet Union

This book examines how Britain reached its nuclear weapons choices during the Cold War. It follows the Chevaline program, which upgraded the Polaris missile force, and the 1980 and 1982 decisions to acquire Trident from the United States, first the C-4 and then the D-5 version. It also looks at the contested 1983 decision to station Ground Launched Cruise Missiles on British soil.

Chevaline was among the costliest and most technically demanding defence projects Britain had undertaken up to that point. Its justification relied heavily on intelligence assessments of Soviet anti-ballistic missiles, which raised doubts about whether Polaris would remain an effective strategic deterrent. Polaris with Chevaline stayed in service until Trident replaced it in 1994.

The C-4 decision of 1980 was shaped by the Chevaline experience and by the drawbacks of having different systems from those of the United States. A comprehensive study, the Duff-Mason Report, was the main background document used by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government when it bought C-4. The later move to the more powerful Trident II D-5 was driven by similar concerns about commonality with American forces that would only last for a limited time. The D-5 remains operational with both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy.