Game theory

Light and often funny in tone, this book still delivers a tight, thorough treatment of game theory and bargaining models. It interprets and analyses a wide range of conflict situations that arise in economics, sociology, strategic studies and warfare, pairing plain explanation with mathematical reasoning.

The opening section is an informal introduction that non-mathematicians can follow. It introduces the extensive form of a game, pure and mixed strategies, and the minimax theorem. The second chapter then develops the general theory of non-cooperative games in full mathematical detail.

Next comes a compact, clear account of linear programming, covering both theory and practice. The author uses it as a working tool for matrix games and economic problems, moving from duality theory to the equilibrium theorem, and explains in detail how the simplex algorithm is computed.

The remaining chapters survey cooperative games in a broad yet concise way and offer a fresh look at bargaining models. They guide the reader through the Shapley and Nash solutions for bimatrix games and show, with careful illustrations, how to find the best threat strategies.