Winning a Future War

Winning a Future War looks at how the U.S. Navy changed itself technically, tactically and strategically to win the Pacific War. It had to build a fleet that could fight far from home, with no established bases, against an enemy that had many bases and was fighting in its own waters. Norman Friedman argues that much of the credit belongs to the war gaming done at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

The book stresses how radical the change was, since its results now seem ordinary. After World War I the U.S. Navy was a battleship fleet much like other navies. The British had shown that naval aircraft could be a useful auxiliary to battleships, and the war had shown that an amphibious landing could be made against resistance, though not that it would work well. By 1943 to 1945, carriers were the core of the fleet and assaults on defended shores were routine. Without them, fighting World War II would have been impossible.

Friedman points out that the other two major navies did not follow the same path. Japan built a strong carrier striking force but gave it too few reserves to keep fighting, and developed little amphibious capability that could handle shore defenses. It could not have attacked its own fortified islands, let alone Normandy or southern France. Britain built carriers but kept their air groups small, because until well into World War II it saw them mainly as support for the battle fleet, and it also lacked an effective amphibious force. All three navies had excellent, widely experienced officers, so the question is what set the Americans apart.

The book also holds that the interwar experience at the War College offers guidance on what works, and why, for anyone facing new demands for transformation today.